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Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Re: State v. Salas-Leyva 
Case No. 900418-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j)# Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellant cites Ex parte Carpenter. Ala. Sup. Ct., No, 
1900342, August 30, 1991 (49 Cr. Law Reptr. 1510), in support of 
his argument that the officers did not have a reasonable 
articulable suspicion to detain him based on an informant's tip. 
This argument is found at pages 12-13 of Appellant's opening 
brief and pages 4-6 of Appellant's reply brief and was discussed 
in oral argument. A copy of a digest of the opinion from 
Volume 49 of the Criminal Law Reporter is attached hereto. 
Very truly yours, 
^tft-C.Ldccw 
Joan C. Watt 
Chief Appellate Attorney 
JCW:kll 
Attachment 
cc ( w / a t t a c h . ) : Judith S. H. Atherton 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
DELIVERED original and seven copies of the foregoing 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 23 0 South 500 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and a copy of the foregoing to 
the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this day of October, 1991. 
Justice Act) may not be used to assist "in [the] pursuit of slate 
court remedies" for unexhausted claims. Id. at 1505 (emphasis 
in original). Central to Lindsey's holding was the court's 
conclusion that state court proceedings were neither "ancillary 
to" nor a "proceeding under section 2254." Id. at 1506, 1508. 
Consequently, the petitioner's request for the assistance of a 
federally appointed lawyer and psychiatric expert fell outside 
the terms of both Section 848(q) and Section 3006A. 
[Text] Yet here, by contrast, petitioner has not presented a 
mixed petition to this court and is proceeding under section 
2254. He is thus entitled to appointed counsel, which he has 
already received, and such ancillary services as arc "reasonably 
necessary" to his representation. This court is persuaded that, 
after McCleskey, the research and investigation of new claims 
is reasonably necessary to the representation of this capital 
prisoner. 
Although the doctrine of exhaustion forbids federal courts 
from adjudicating a petition that contains any unexhausted 
claims, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), it in no way 
prevents Congress from funding research and investigation in 
federal court that may touch on unexhausted claims. 
Exhaustion "is principally designed to protect the state 
courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and [to] prevent 
disruption of state judicial proceedings." Lundy, 455 U.S. at 
518. Under the exhaustion doctrine, it is for the state courts, in 
the first instance, to pass upon and correct alleged violations of 
prisoners' federal constitutional rights. Id. This requirement 
minimizes the instances in which federal courts, by deciding 
constitutional issues, will intrude into state processes. McCles-
keyy 113 L.Ed.2d at 544. 
The investigation of possible claims under section 848 (q) 
thus does no violence to the exhaustion doctrine, which is 
limited to the adjudication of constitutional claims. That 
attorneys Gardner and Derham, while the petition is pending 
in federal court, may research and investigate unexhausted 
claims—in precisely the same manner that privately retained 
attorneys may research and investigate such claims—does not 
intrude on state sovereignty. The federal court in no way has 
trod on the state court's resolution of the federal constitutional 
issues. Following the investigation, the prisoner cither will 
decide that a claim exists and pursue it in state court, in 
accordance with the exhaustion requirement, or will decide the 
claim is not tenable and abandon it. 
The rule that district courts should dismiss petitions that 
contain unexhausted claims does not mean that a district court 
should dismiss a petition merely because the attorney's thought 
processes turn to new claims. The latter rule would prove 
unduly burdensome both for counsel and for the court. Because 
legal claims do not spring fully grown like Athena from the 
head of Zeus, an attorney cannot determine, at the outset, 
whether this thinking and research will result in an exhausted 
or unexhausted claim. Counsel's duty to represent his client 
would be severely compromised if his talents and zeal, not to 
mention his compensation, were limited to exhausted claims. 
Similarly, it would be extraordinarily taxing for the district 
court to set the point at which the attorney's efforts were so 
directed to the pursuit of an unexhausted claim that compensa-
tion would be disallowed. The Supreme Court, in fact, has 
already warned district courts against engaging in the "diffi-
cult if not impossible task" of sorting exhausted from un-
exhausted claims. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 519. [End Text/ 
Once counsel has had the opportunity to conduct prelimi-
nary research and investigation sufficient to identify a viable 
claim, these proceedings may be stayed in order to permit 
exhaustion. At that point, the petitioner will be able to make 
an informed choice as to whether to pursue the claim in state 
court or waive it. 
Comity and federalism address the federal court's consider-
ation of the merits of a claim; we have found no case that 
extends these principles to the attorney's investigative process. 
Nothing would be gained by returning the case to state court 
every time counsel fancies the existence of an unexhausted 
claim. There is ample time to do that in the event the petitioner 
chooses to assert such a claim. "Federalism" does not require a 
game of ping-pong between the state and federal courts. 
Coleman has presented a petition containing 13 exhausted 
claims. We have previously granted him the time to conduct an 
investigation in order to finalize his petition as required by 
McCIeskey. Today we hold that Congress has granted him, by 
statute, the financial resources necessary to make that opportu-
nity meaningful. — Peckham, J. 
INFORMER'S TRACK RECORD OF RELIABILITY 
DIDNT SUPPLY REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR STOP 
Lack of verifiable details, basis of informer's 
knowledge preclude finding of reasonable 
suspicion, Alabama says. 
A vehicle stop conducted by a police officer on the 
basis of a tip from a highly reliable informer was 
unconstitutional, a majority of the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals held August 30, because of the offi-
cer's failure either to question the informer about the 
basis for the informer's rather unspecific claim and the 
lack of any corroboration of the tip. (Ex parte Carpen-
ter, Ala SupCt, No. 1900342, 8/30/91) 
The tip alleged that the defendant was then driving on 
a particular street while in possession of drugs and a 
weapon. The officer, who later testified that he consid-
ered tips from this informer to be like "money in the 
bank," did not ask for more detail or how the informer 
came about his information. 
The majority concluded that the officer lacked the 
reasonable suspicion required for a stop under the 
Fourth Amendment. In Alabama v. White, 47 CrL 2148 
(US SupCt 1990), the informer was anonymous; on the 
other hand, the White informer's credibility was en-
hanced by the fact that he gave predictive information 
that the police could verify. Here, in contrast, the tip 
concerned only the defendant's current conduct, and the 
only details the police could corroborate before making 
the stop were facts anyone observing the defendant could 
relate. Furthermore, the tip in White was somewhat 
more detailed than the unprobed accusation of the in-
former in this case. The mere fact that the officer knew 
the informer to be reliable cannot, without more, raise a 
bare allegation of this kind to the level of reasonable 
suspicion, the majority said. 
Dissenting, Justice Maddox, joined by Justices Almon 
and Steagall, argued that the informer's tip was at least 
as reliable as the one in White, 
Also dissenting, Justice Houston, noting that the tip 
was partially verified, argued that the tip supplied rea-
sonable suspicion for the stop. 
Digest of Opinion: Charles Carpenter was indicted for pos-
session of a controlled substance on the basis of evidence 
gained through a warrantless search of his vehicle. The trial 
court suppressed the evidence, but the court of appeals re-
versed. Carpenter appeals. 
Police officer Griffis testified that he received a telephone 
call from an "informant" who advised him that Carpenter 
would be driving up South Mobile Ave. in Fairhopc in his own 
automobile and that he would be in possession of a firearm and 
controlled substances. Officer Griffis said that, before the 
arrest, he knew Carpenter and he knew what type of car 
Carpenter drove. He further testified that the identity of the 
informer was known to him and that the informer was reliable. 
Officer Griffis proceeded to South Mobile Ave., where he 
observed Carpenter in his car leaving a residential driveway. 
Griffis followed Carpenter for a brief period and then stopped 
him. After ordering Carpenter and a passenger to get out of 
the car, Griffis observed a pistol protruding from a zippered 
carrying case. Griffis then searched the car and discovered 
controlled substances inside the covering of the gearshift box. 
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Griffis placed Carpenter under arrest for the offense of carry-
ing a weapon without a permit. 
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked Officer 
Griffis what kind of drugs the informer said Carpenter had, 
where they were located in the car, whether he himself had 
seen the drugs and gun in the car, and how he knew they were 
there. To all these questions the officer replied, "I didn't ask 
him." The defense lawyer asked whether it wasn't "normal 
police practice" to ask a tipster questions or to find out about 
the reliability or veracity of the information. The officer 
replied that those steps arc taken "if you don't have a reliable 
informant." In contrast, "this informant, if he tells me some-
thing, it's in there, it's like money in the bank. It's there." The 
officer testified that on previous occasions the informer had 
provided him with information that resulted in the arrest and 
conviction of 20 or more people. 
The question is whether the officer had a reasonable and 
articulable basis to warrant stopping Carpenter's car. In Ala-
bama v. White, the police received an anonymous tip that the 
defendant would be leaving a specific apartment building at a 
particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the 
right taillight broken, that she would be going to a particular 
motel by a particular route, and that she would be in possession 
of cocaine inside a brown attache case. Before stopping the 
defendant's vehicle, the police verified the apartment building 
from which the defendant exited, the particular vehicle she 
used, the time the defendant left the apartment building, and 
the route she took. The Supreme Court held that the police had 
reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The court based its 
decision on the fact that the informer was able to accurately 
state what would transpire in the future. 
We hold, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, 
that the facts of this case did not create a reasonable suspicion 
to justify stopping Carpenter on the street. It is clear that 
Officer Griffis relied solely on the fact that the informer in this 
case was known to him to be reliable. Absent evidence that the 
informer had given the police reliable information in the past, 
there are no specific or particularized facts on which Griffis 
could have based a reasonable suspicion. The informer said 
merely that Carpenter would be driving up South Mobile Ave. 
He did not state on what he based his knowledge of that fact. 
Unlike the facts in Alabama v. White, this information con-
cerned Carpenter's present whereabouts, information available 
to anyone who knew him and was near that location. In 
Alabama v. White and Dale v. State, 466 So2d 196 (Ala 
CtCrimApp 1985), heavy emphasis was placed on the fact that 
the informers were able to state where the defendants would be 
headed in the future and the fact that the police could 
independently corroborate the informers' tips. Moreover, in 
White the informer was able to say what type of controlled 
substances the defendant would be carrying. In this case, there 
was no specific or particularized evidence concerning the type 
of controlled substance that Carpenter was carrying in his car, 
nor was there evidence that Carpenter had been previously 
suspected of possessing controlled substances. 
The only factor that would create a reasonable suspicion 
that Carpenter was engaged in some kind of criminal activity 
was that the informer was known to Griffis to be reliable. This 
court is unwilling to say that a police officer, armed with the 
scant information from a known reliable informer that a person 
is engaged in criminal activity, has reasonable suspicion to stop 
the person suspected of the illegal activity. The trial court's 
suppression order is affirmed. — Kennedy, J. 
Dissent: Alabama v. White involved an anonymous tip. This 
case involves a tip by a known and reliable informer. The tip 
had a high degree of reliability and the information conveyed 
by the tip was substantial. It clearly met the standard for an 
investigative stop set out in Alabama v. White. — Maddox, 
Almon, and Steagall, JJ. 
Dissent: The officer had information from an informer who 
was known to him and whose reliability was established by 
extensive past experience. The information was partially veri-
fied. Under White, the stopping of Carpenter's vehicle was justified by at least reasonable suspicion. — Houston, J. 
FEEL OF LUMP IN MAN'S POCKET DURING FRISK 
DIDN'T ALLOW OFFICER TO PULL OBJECT OUT 
Pennsylvania court declines to extend plain-
view exception to "plain touch." 
A police officer who felt a small pebble-like lump in 
the pants pocket of a man he had detained and was 
patting down for weapons violated the Fourth Amend-
ment by reaching into the pocket and pulling out the 
object, a majority of the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
ruled August 23. In so holding, the majority refused to 
recognize a "plain touch" variant of the plain-view 
exception to the warrant requirement, at least under the 
circumstances presented in this case. (Commonwealth 
(Pennsylvania) v. Marconi, Pa SuperCt, No. 2354 Phila-
delphia 1990,8/23/91) 
The officer justified his retrieval of the item from the 
defendant's pocket by testifying that he believed, from 
his experience in investigating drug trafficking and his 
knowledge that the defendant had a prior methamphet-
amine conviction, that it was a "rock" of methamphet-
amine. In fact, it was. But the majority decided that the 
chain of events leading up to the drug's discovery did not 
supply adequate grounds for the intrusion. The encoun-
ter began when the officer became suspicious of the 
defendant's conduct, approached him to investigate, and 
performed a protective frisk of him for weapons pursu-
ant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). However, the 
majority pointed out, a Terry frisk is limited to a cursory 
pat-down of the subject's clothing for any weapons he 
may possess, and any further intrusion is justified only if 
the officer detects the presence of a weapon. None was 
detected here, it noted, so the search should have stopped 
at that point. 
The majority declined to uphold the seizure on the 
ground that the officer's tactile perception of the lump 
gave him probable cause to believe it was drugs. There 
was no way that the "minute" quantity of the drug 
inside the pocket could have been identified by the 
officer through his sense of touch, it said; the feel of the 
object suggested only the possibility of crime, not the 
probability of it. The majority deemed the sense of touch 
qualitatively different from the senses of sight, hearing, 
smell, and taste, each of which yields consistent percep-
tions every time. 
Judge Kelly, concurring in the result, agreed that the 
feel of the drugs in the defendant's pocket could not have 
given the officer probable cause, but disagreed with the 
majority's suggestion that tactile sensations cannot be 
factored into the probable cause equation. 
Digest of Opinion: Officer Charles Palo, an experienced 
drug investigator, was on patrol duty at 7:15 p.m. when he saw 
a Cadillac pull into the parking lot of a church and school, 
which were closed. Officer Palo parked in a lot across the 
street and saw the car's driver, Robert Marconi, exit and 
vomit. Marconi then switched places in the car with a female 
passenger, Marconi's wife. Officer Palo drove over to the 
Cadillac to investigate and determine whether the occupants 
were intoxicated and why they were parked next to the school. 
Officer Palo approached the Cadillac and, after identifying 
himself, saw Robert Marconi apparently trying to conceal 
something in the rear of his pants. He told Marconi to place his 
hands on the dashboard. The officer was concerned for his 
safety. He recognized Marconi and knew that he had previous-
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